The NLRB in the Dog House - Can an
Old Board Learn New Tricks?t

CHARLES J. MORRIS*

In this Article, Professor Morris uses the fiftieth anniversary of
the National Labor Relations Act as a backdrop for a reassessment of the NLRB's performance. He concludes that the Board
has failed to carry out its statutory mandate, especially criticizing
the Board's woeful record of enforcement of core employee protection provisions. Professor Morris demonstrates that the Act's unambiguous statement of policy, encouraging free collective bargaining and employee organizationalrights,still governs. He then
urges that the Board invoke its neglected statutory authority and
makes specific recommendationsfor nonlegislative procedural reform of the NLRB. Such reform would revitalize the Board and
vindicate the policies embodied in the Act.
INTRODUCTION

The NLRB is indeed in the dog house. The fiftieth anniversary of
the National Labor Relations Act1 provides one more occasion to
assess the Labor Board's performance. That performance has been
assessed many times before, indeed with boring regularity.2 The ret An earlier version of this Article appears in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (C. Morris ed. 1987),
copyright 0 1987 by Bureau of National Affairs, which has granted permission for the
publication of this revised version.
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of San Diego School of Law. A.B. 1944, Temple University; LL.B. 1948,
Columbia University.
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1982) [hereinafter NLRA].
2. See, e.g., Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for
Rulemaking, in PROCEEDINGS OF NYU 37TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (1984), reprintedin 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 163 (1985); Fanning, National Labor Relations Act and the Role of the NLRB, 29 LAB. L.J. 683 (1978); Gould, Some Reflections
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sulting cries of woe and despair have been heard so often that one
can only wonder whether anyone is out there listening. Fifty years is
surely time enough for the Board to have demonstrated whether it
reasonably can fulfill the primary statutory objectives with which it
was vested.
This Article focuses upon Board procedures, structural organization, and remedial processes. It does not directly examine substantive
law. Of course changes in substantive law usually attract the most
public attention. The pendulum-like swings of substantive law from
administration to administration are indeed noteworthy; whenever a
major substantive law decision is overturned we are reminded of the
doctrinal instability that characterizes the interpretation of the
NLRA.3 But such substantive law changes, whether effected by the
Reagan Board, by a prior Board, or by a future Board, are of lesser
importance than the slow and silent erosion of the Board's enforcement authority which has been occurring for more than two decades.
Although the pace of this deterioration has been gradual, its consequences have been devastating. This erosion of the Board's effectiveness has undermined its capacity to discharge its basic statutory
duties - so much so that if the Board no longer can fulfill the essential objectives of the NLRA, then it should move over and allow
some other entity to take its place. If the Board as an institution is
either structurally unable or politically unwilling to enforce the
NLRA, and enforce it with stability and reasonable regard for stare
decisis, then perhaps we should explore some other means to accomplish that task. One such means would be an article III labor court,4
on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and
Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1986); Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes:Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
7 (1985); Irving, Crisis at the NLRB: A Call for Reordering Priorities,7 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 47 (1981); Irving, Do We Need a Labor Board?, 30 LAB. L.J. 389 (1979);
Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1123 (1986); Modjeska, In Defense of the NLRB, 33 MERCER L. REV..
851 (1982); Morris & Turk, A Labor Board Roundup and Forecast: The Balance Continues, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L J. 32 (1985); St. Antoine, FederalRegulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 Cm. KENT L. REv. 631 (1985); Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Direction of the NLRB, 34 LAB. L.J. 215 (1985);
Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act At Fifty, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I
(1986); Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for
Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1983).
3. For example, in Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962), the
Board established a rule that elections would be set aside on the basis of pre-election
statements deemed to be material where there was insufficient time for the other side to
reply. That rule was abandoned in Shopping Kart Food Mkt., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311
(1977). But in General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), the Board returned to the
Hollywood Ceramics rule. Then, in Midland National Life Insurance, 263 N.L.R.B. 127
(1982), Hollywood Ceramics was again overruled and the permissive Shopping Kart rule
was reinstated.
4. See Morris, Board Procedure, Remedies, and the Enforcement Process, in
AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

NLRB Reform

[VOL. 24: 9, 1987]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

which indeed would represent a drastic and unfamiliar direction for
American labor law. That alternative, however, should be a last resort. On the other hand, if the Board does have the statutory capacity to function as Congress intended - and I firmly believe that it
has - and if the real problem is essentially an institutional unwillingness to utilize available statutory procedures and remedies, then a
reinvigorated Board determined to enforce the Act would be preferable to a labor court. Although a labor court theoretically should
function soundly and efficiently, it would still be an untried entity;
such an option, therefore, should be pursued only after it has been
demonstrated that the Board either is inherently incapable of fulfilling its major statutory functions or is not likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
Although a strong case can be made for an article III labor court,
which I have discussed elsewhere, 5 this Article will focus primarily
upon the desirability of attempting a nonlegislative restructuring and

a corresponding revitalization of the Labor Board itself. I believe
such an approach is possible, though perhaps not very probable in

view of the formidable political and inertial forces that such a program would have to overcome. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to
explore what could be accomplished under the existing statute in the
event an institutional desire to enforce the NLRA effectively should

arise in the near future.
STATUTORY OBJECTIVES

This discussion begins with the assumption that the Board has not
been fulfilling its basic statutory objectives. Although that conclusion
has been amply documented,6 I shall review some of the pertinent
ACT 335 (C. Morris ed. 1987) [hereinafter Morris, Board Procedure];Morris, The Case
for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law Concerning a Specialized Article III
Court and the Reorganizationof Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471 (1972) [hereinafter
Morris, Article III Court].
5. See Morris, Board Procedure, supra note 4, at 353-60; Morris, Article III
Court, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., W. COOKE, UNION ORGANIZING AND PUBLIC POLICY: FAILURE To
SECURE FIRST CONTRACTS (1985); R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do?
228-45 (1984); Flanagan, NLRA Litigation and Union Representation, 38 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1986); Kleiner, Unionism and Employer Discrimination:Analysis of 8(a)(3) Violations, 23 INDUS. REL. 234 (1984); Roomkin & Block, Case Processing Time and the
Outcome of RepresentationElections: Some EmpiricalEvidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV.
75; Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983); US. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCERNS
REGARDING IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE CHARGES AGAINST EMPLOYERS FOR UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES (1982). See generally AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF

studies and statistical evidence and compare such data against an
available objective standard which defines what the Board's enforcement record ought to be. What standard could be more objective
than the one provided by the statement of congressional intent imprinted in the statute itself? Although there has been some inaccurate perception in much of the recent debate about the fundamental
roles of the NLRB, the statutory language and legislative history are
clear as to what those roles were intended to be.
Let me note the obvious at the outset. The original congressional
intent contained in the Wagner Act7 was substantially expanded by
later legislative amendments, particularly by the Taft-Hartley Act. 8
Notwithstanding some revisionist views to the contrary, those
amendments did not change the core objective of the statute. The
evidence is written clearly in the amended statute and was authoritatively voiced in pertinent legislative reports and debates. Although it
is true that the Taft-Hartley Act added two important new dimensions to the scope of the NLRA, the underlying statutory objective
remained intact.
Two statutory statements of policy should be noted. Section 1 of
the original Wagner Act set out the basic statutory objective.9 Although the Taft-Hartley Congress added language to that section,
the expression of the core intent of the NLRA was deliberately left
undisturbed. The Taft-Hartley Congress also added another declaration of intent to the overall Labor Management Relations Act; this
was a separate section 110 preceding title I, which became the
amended version of the Act. Both declarations require our attention.
The Wagner Act declaration opened by stating that "[t]he denial
by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest ... ."2 The

Taft-Hartley Congress changed that statement by inserting the word
"some" before "employers" in both phrases. It thus removed the
blanket indictment of all employers but still pointedly accused "some
employers" of both denying employees the right to organize and refusing to accept the process of collective bargaining. This was taken
from the Senate version of the amended Act,1 2 but the House acceded to it following its adoption by Conference Committee. The
original House version would have eliminated the Wagner Act decla(C. Morris ed. 1987).
7. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
8. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982) [hereinafter LMRAJ.
9. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
10. LMRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
11. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
12. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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ration of policy completely. 3 The Congress thus deliberately retained the Wagner Act declaration of basic statutory policy, which
included the following statements:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes. . . and
equality of bargaining power between employers and
by restoring
14
employees.

Whereupon the "policy of the United States" was expressly declared
as the
encouraging [of] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
. . protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.'
*

Accordingly, the Taft-Hartley Act reaffirmed those statements as
the central policy of the statute.
Nevertheless, there has been a widespread misapprehension of the
congressional intent behind the Taft-Hartley Act. This stems from a
popular failure to distinguish between the perception of certain
anticollective bargaining decisions of the Board as well as the conspicuous failure of the Board to provide vigorous enforcement of section 7 rights, and the reality of the compromise reached in the TaftHartley Conference Committee to reconcile differences between the
House and Senate bills. A distinction should be made between what
the Board has done

-

or failed to do -

since passage of the Taft-

Hartley Act, and what the statute actually declares that it should do.
Time may have changed the popular perception of the proper role of
the NLRB, but it should not have affected the determination of what
the actual congressional intent was in 1947. Accordingly, I cannot
fully agree with James Gross' assessment that "the Taft-Hartley Act
contains conflicting statements of purpose that open the national labor law to conflicting interpretations of congressional intent. '"16 Regardless of his observation that "Smith, Hartley, and the majority of
the House certainly did not intend to promote collective bargaining
as the solution to labor problems, 17 the fact remains that the Con13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Id.
Gross, supra note 2, at 13.
Id. Professor Gross seems to ignore the Conference Committee's rejection of

ference Committee pointedly rejected the House bill's attempted repeal of the statutory statement that collective bargaining is the national labor policy. Moreover, nothing in the separate statement of
"purpose and policy" in the new Taft-Hartley preamble diluted
or
was inconsistent with the retained core statement of policy.
It is true that most of the new Taft-Hartley provisions could be
and they certainly were - viewed as anti-union. But those provisions, as well as the corresponding provisions declaring the legislative
purpose, were not intended to change the core objective of the statute. Rather, the Taft-Hartley amendments primarily added substantial provisions regarding union unfair labor practices, as well as a
number of provisions that slowed down the procedures for establishing representation. These amendments indeed provided new statutory
objectives for the Board, but they were in addition to, not a replacement for, the original objectives of the NLRA. The new provisions
were reflected in a new paragraph inserted within the original Wagner Act statement of policy, recognizing "certain practices of some
-

labor organizations . . . burdening or obstructing commerce . . .
through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest .. ."18 Addi-

tionally, as previously noted, there was a separate "Declaration of
Policy" added to the all-inclusive Labor Management Relations Act
stressing the need for "employers, employees, and labor organizations each [to] recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in
relations with each other . . ..," That declaration further stated:
It is the purpose and policy of this [Act] ... to prescribe the legitimate
rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the
rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations
...,to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management
which ...

are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of

the public in connection with labor disputes . .

.

It thus is clear that the totality of the policy language in the TaftHartley Act did two things. First, it reaffirmed the basic objectives
of the Wagner Act, which were to protect the right of employees to
organize and to encourage the "practice and procedure" of collective
bargaining. Second, it declared certain activities of labor organizations to be improper; but in doing so it emphasized the use of "orthe House's version and its pointed retention of the basic Wagner Act objectives, for he

concludes that the LMRA's new "statement of policy . . .was intended at least to

weaken, and possibly to eliminate, collective bargaining." Id. Such a conclusion is an
unwarranted reading of legislative history in view of the unambiguous language of the
statute and the specific rejection of the House sponsor's anticollective bargaining
position.
18. LMRA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
19. Id. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141.
20. Id.
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derly and peaceful procedures" for dispute settlement as provided
under the statute. Indeed, the new statute not only continued to provide for the National Labor Relations Board, it also provided for,
among other things, the establishment of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service 2 1 a procedure to handle national emergency
disputes, 22 and judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 23 Nowhere did the Taft-Hartley Act provide for any dilution
of section 7 rights; indeed, it reaffirmed and added to those rights
because employees were given "the right to refrain" from organizational and concerted activities. 24 Nowhere did it retreat from the
guarantee of the right of employees to "form, join, or assist labor
organizations" or deviate in any manner from the statutory commitment to the concept of collective bargaining as the cornerstone of
national labor policy. On the contrary, in recommending the bill, 25
Senator Taft reaffirmed the centrality of collective bargaining by
stating: "Basically, I believe that the committee feels, almost unanimously, that the solution of our labor problems must rest on a free
economy and on free collective bargaining. The bill is certainly
based on that proposition."12 6 And during Senate debate which preceded the vote to override President Truman's veto, Senator Taft
emphasized that the bill "is based on the theory of the Wagner Act
... .It is based on the theory that the solution of the labor prob",2.
lem in the United States is free, collective bargaining .
Thus, notwithstanding some popular misconceptions, it is evident
from the language of the statute and its legislative history that the
Taft-Hartley Act did not change the basic national commitment to
the encouragement of collective bargaining and the protection of the
rights of employees under section 7 to organize and engage in concerted activity for "the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. '28 The only addition to section 7 was that
employees also had the right to refrain from such activity. 29
21. Id. § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 172.

22. Id. §§ 206-210, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-179.

23. Id. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
24. Id. § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 157.

25. S.REP. No. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
26. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
AcT, 1947, at 1007 (1948).
27. Id. at 1653 (emphasis added).
28. NLRA § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
29. Professor Gross accurately observes: "The 1947 Declaration of Policy, coupled with a passage added in 1947 to Section 7 that affirms workers' right to refrain from
engaging in collective bargaining, has been interpreted to mean that free choice and indi-

The Eightieth Congress was concerned with the power of "big labor." The hearings and debates and the resulting legislation focused
on curbing much of that power, specifically secondary boycotts,
closed and union shop agreements, certain strikes and picketing
which on occasion had turned into violent confrontations, jurisdictional disputes, and some features of internal union affairs. Important structural and procedural modifications, particularly the separation of the office of General Counsel from the Board proper, were
also enacted. In addition, the Supreme Court's pronouncement regarding the constitutional right of free speech3" was codified into section 8(c) of the statute. But no substantive changes were made in the
text of the provisions defining employer unfair labor practices. Nor
were any such changes made by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments.3 1 Accordingly, the employer unfair labor practices contained
in the statute today are basically the same as they were fifty years
ago; the accompanying declarations of congressional intent were reconfirmed by the Taft-Hartley Congress and were not disturbed by
the Landrum-Griffin Congress.
Consequently, the objective standard by which to measure the
Board's record remains the declaration of policy in section 1 of the
NLRA. To assess how well the Board has fulfilled that statutory
mandate, we must look primarily to sections 7 and 8(a), which continue to contain the core rights and duties guaranteed by the Act.
The union unfair labor practices of section 8(b) were designed to
curb union power; and those provisions, especially those limiting the
use of economic coercion against employers, have consistently been
enforced with remarkable success. 3 2 The latter provisions, however,
are ancillary to the core provisions of section 7 and 8(a) - because
in the main, union unfair labor practices depend upon the existence
of established unions. In particular, the secondary boycott and jurisdictional dispute provisions in section 8(b)(4)3 3 generally assume the
existence of unions that have bargaining rights with primary employers. The recognitional and organizational picketing provisions of secvidual rights are at least as important as the right to collective bargaining." Gross, supra
note 2, at 13. But the right of employees to refrain from engaging in section 7 activity
was never intended to diminish the enforcement of section 7 rights for employees who
affirmatively wish to exercise them.
30. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); see also NLRB
v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768
(1943). See generally 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 80-82 (2d ed. 1983).
31. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187, 401-402, 411415, 431-440, 461-466, 481-483, 501-504, 521-131).
32. See Morris, The Deterrent Effect of Quick, Certain and Strong Remedies on
Unfair Labor Practices Under the LMRA, 15 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REP. 16 (1978); see
also Flanagan, supra note 6, at 979-80.
33. NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
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tion 8(b)(7),34 added by the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, merely
emphasize the primacy of section 9 procedures and requirements for
the establishment of union recognition.
THE ENFORCEMENT RECORD

Whereas the Board's record of enforcement of sections 8(b)(4)
and 8(b)(7) indicates that it has been reasonably efficient as to those
unfair labor practices directed against unions, its record of enforcement of the core employee protection sections, that is, cases which
involve employer interference with organizational activity under section 8(a)(1), discriminatory discharge cases under section 8(a)(3),
and refusal-to-bargain cases under section 8(a)(5), has been woefully inadequate. In addition, the delay factor in both representation
("R") cases and unfair labor practice ("C") cases has severely hampered the implemention of those basic statutory rights. This record
of inadequate performance is not a recent phenomenon; several important studies covering periods of many years have documented the
Board's impotence in providing effective enforcement of these provisions of the statute.
Harvard economists Richard Freeman and James Medoff summarized and evaluated many of those studies and also certain statistical
data contained in the Board's annual reports.15 Among their conclusions, several should be noted. First, union success in achieving bargaining rights is significantly lower when there is a long delay between the filing of the petition and the holding of the election. That
conclusion is also supported by the independent findings of Myron
Roomkin and Richard Block. 86 Their study, based on magnetic tape
data supplied by the Board for fiscal years 1973-1978, found that
delay was indeed linked to election outcome, the implication being
"that delay affects elections the most when the outcome is in doubt
and this class of contests generally result [sic] in a vote against
unionization."

8

They noted that "[i]f delay results in creating an

employer win from what would otherwise be a union win, then the
delay has resulted in a change in the substantive outcome of the
process." 38
34.
Reporting
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (as amended by Labor-Management
and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704, 73 Stat. 542).
R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 6, at 236.
Roomkin & Block, supra note 6.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 97.

Second, Freeman and Medoff conclude that illegal employer discrimination against union activists, particularly firing, has a substantial impact upon union success in winning elections; "[o]nly in the
rare case where a fired worker is ordered reinstated by the NLRB
and actually returns to his job before the election does breaking the
law backfire."39
Third, by analyzing Board statistics from 1960 through 1980, they
observed that although the number of union elections scarcely
changed during that period, the number of illegal activities committed by employers increased by 400%; the number of charges of discharges for union activity increased by 300%; and the number of
employees awarded back pay increased by 500%. Such impersonal
statistics demonstrate the reality of what happens in an election
campaign and indicate how irrelevant the Board's enforcement
processes have become. As Freeman and Medoff observed:
Despite increasingly sophisticated methods for disguising the cause of such
firings, more employers were judged guilty of firing workers for union activity in 1980 than ever before. To obtain an indication of the risk faced by
workers desiring a union, one may divide the number of persons fired for
union activity in 1980 by the number of persons who voted for a union in
elections. The result is remarkable: one in twenty workers who favored the
union got fired. Assuming that the vast bulk of union supporters are relatively inactive, the likelihood that an outspoken worker, exercising his or
her legal rights under the Taft-Hartley Act, gets fired for union activity is,
by these data, extraordinarily high. Put differently, there is roughly one
case of illegal discharge deemed meritorious by the NLRB for every NLRB
representation election. 40

Obviously, the Board has not succeeded in providing effective enforcement. Nor has it created a legal atmosphere conducive to the
achievement of widespread voluntary compliance. In this regard, the
NLRA may be compared to title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,41
which was no more popular when enacted than the Wagner or TaftHartley Acts. But the remedial sections of the NLRA and title VII
have much in common. Both provide for "affirmative action" orders;
in fact, the NLRA was the source of the "affirmative action" language in title VII.42 Both statutes are designed to be remedial rather
than punitive in their application. However, the compliance history
of the two statutes presents a study in contrasts. Title VII generally
has been firmly enforced with meaningful remedies;43 it is less costly
39. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 6, at 236 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 232-33.
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 259,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
42. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
43. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW (2d ed. 1983).
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to comply with that statute than to violate it." The opposite has
been true of the NLRA; as to the core portions of that statute, the
Board clearly has failed to fulfill its mandate "to prevent" persons
from engaging in unfair labor practices - language which implicitly
endorses the concept of voluntary compliance. Ironically, section 10,
which covers enforcement, is entitled "Prevention of Unfair Labor
Practices,' 5 but in the aggregate, the Board has been singularly unsuccessful in preventing the commission of unfair labor practices
under the core provisions of the NLRA.
Not only has the Board failed to prevent such practices, it actually
has encouraged their commission by its ineffective processes. A recently published study by Morris Kleiner noted that employers found

guilty of unfair labor practices are more likely, rather than less
46
likely, to commit further unfair labor practices. The study, which
was based upon a regression analysis of NLRB case data from 1970
through 1980, determined the following:

Firms that have previously violated Section 8(a)(3) may have found that
the marginal benefits outweigh the marginal costs. Firms that violate this
section of the Act may find significant benefits in the chilling effect on
union organization efforts and on union aggressiveness once they are organized. If this occurs, then using the same [illegal] tactic again may be costan administrative
effective
47 strategy, even if the firm loses the case before
judge.

Observing that empirical results were consistent with that theory,
Kleiner noted:
The past violations variable [was] statistically significant and suggest[ed]
that firms that have committed unfair labor practices in previous years are
more likely to commit them in the current period ....

[F]irms that com-

mitted past violations were over twice as likely to commit current violations.
These results support the hypothesis that the48law's penalties do not serve as
a major barrier to employer discrimination.

Thus, not only is it cost effective for an employer to discharge
union activists in breach of section 8(a)(3), a violation which most

often occurs before an election, it apparently is also cost effective for

an employer to violate the Act after the election. Further, evidence
44. See Blumrosen, Six Conditionsfor Meaningful Self-Regulation, 69 A.B.A. J.
1264 (1983).
45. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982)(emphasis added).
46. The study examined specific information about a random sample of firms
listed on the American Stock Exchange, using Standard and Poors' COMPUSTAT as a
data source. See Kleiner, Unionism and Employer Discriminatiorn Analysis of 8(a)(3)
Violations, 23 INDUS. REL. 234 (1984).
47. Id. at 237.
48. Id. at 240.

indicates that it is advantageous to an employer's prospects for not
reaching agreement on a collective bargaining contract if a delay in
Board procedures arises, such as in the processing of objections to an
election. According to a recent investigation of first-contract negotiation outcomes conducted by William Cooke, "[e]mpirical support
. . .for the hypothesis that

. .

.NLRB delays in the resolution of

employer objections and challenges to election results, the refusal to
bargain in good faith and discrimination subsequent to election victories have profound effect upon reducing the probability of agreement. ' 49 Quantifying the effects of post-election unfair labor practices and delay factors, Cooke concluded that "employers who
refused to bargain in good faith and/or illegally discharged union
activists

. . .

reduced the probability of unions successfully negotiat-

ing contracts by 32-36 percentage points." 50 The estimated magnitude of negative relationship between NLRB procedural delay and
the securing of a contract indicated that "on average, every one
month delay between election date and NLRB close of objections
and challenges to election outcomes reduces the probability of obtaining an agreement by as much as 4 percentage points." 51 Thus,
even when unions win elections they often fail to achieve the statutory objective of a contractual collective bargaining relationship, for
during the period of 1979-1980, in one of every four union certification victories, the union subsequently failed to obtain a collective
bargaining agreement. 52
These findings offer a disheartening view of the Board's efforts to
enforce the basic provisions of the Act. It is not necessary, however,
to resort to controlled investigations or even to the abundant anecdotal evidence which every union representative readily can supply in
order to learn of the Board's failures. An available source of data,
which the foregoing studies also have used, is the compilation of statistical tables in various volumes of the Board's annual reports. Comparing the early years with recent years reveals a general trend towards nonenforcement. Reviewing a twenty-year span from 1962
through 1981, the data show a two-fold increase in charges of discriminatory discharges under section 8(a)(3), a seven-fold increase
in the number of employees receiving back pay for unlawful discharges, and a three-fold increase in section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charges. 53 Such drastic increases cannot be explained by in49.

W. COOKE, UNION ORGANIZING AND PUBLIC POLICY: FAILURE TO SECURE

FIRST CONTRACTS 94 (1985). The study was conducted pursuant to a grant from the W.
E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
50. Id. at 90.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 94.
53. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1962); 28 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1963); 29 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1964); 30 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
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creases in organizational activity, for union organizing declined
during that same period. Using the number of employees eligible to
vote in representation elections" as a barometer of organizational

activity discloses that in 1962 there were 536,047 eligible voter employees, but by 1981 that number declined to 449,243. Thus, in rela-

tion to the volume of union activity, the increase in employer unfair
labor practices is even greater than that revealed by the raw figures.

Furthermore, a contrast between section 8(a)(3) activity in 1970 and
such activity in 1980-1981 (the most recent years for complete available figures) demonstrates dramatically how steep the increase has

been. In 1970 there were 608,558 employees eligible to vote in repre-

sentation elections. The following year 6738 employees received
backpay in employment discrimination cases. In other words, taking
into consideration lag time for processing such cases, approximately
one percent of all employees who were involved in election campaigns in 1970 had meritorious cases involving employment discrimination under the Act. Although such a rate of discriminatory employment activity, including discharges, may seem high - indeed it
is - it seems almost acceptable compared to the upward trend for
such violations that peaked during the 1980-1981 period. In 1980,
521,602 employees were involved in election campaigns, and in the

following year, 25,929 employees received back pay because of em-

ployment discrimination. Thus, approximately five percent of all employees in organizationally active bargaining units were terminated
or otherwise denied compensation because of their union involvement. These figures are not unlike the findings of Freeman and
were arrived at using a different method of
Medoff, which
55
computation.
(1965); 31 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1966); 32 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1967); 33 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1968); 34 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1969); 35 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1970); 36 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1971); 37 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1972); 38 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1973); 39 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1974); 40 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1975); 41 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1976); 42 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1977); 43 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1978); 44 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1979); 45 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1980); 46 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2
(1981). At the time when this was written, the 1981 Annual Report was the latest available. For more recent data, see 47 NLRB ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1982), and 48 NLRB
ANN. REP. app. table 2 (1983).
54. See 27-46 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 53, app. table 13.
55. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 6, at 233, 283 n.12. The exact percentage of employees among eligible voters who were discharged for union activity in any
given year cannot be determined with precision from the Board's statistics, but there can
be no doubt that the percentage is too high for a showing of either effective enforcement

The statistical tables in the Board's annual reports also reveal that
union unfair labor practices directed at employers have not been increasing. Since the early 1970's the level of charges for secondary
boycotts and jurisdictional disputes under section 8(b)(4) and organizational and recognitional picketing under section 8(b)(7) has remained relatively constant. 56 Thus, the Board has been reasonably
successful in both enforcing those provisions and deterring the
wholesale commission of union violations, albeit with the aid of section 10(l) injunctions57 and the presence of private damage suits
under section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act5 8 for conduct which also
violates section 8(b)(4). But such enforcement success is not sufficient to justify the Board's continuing to operate in the same old
way. As I noted earlier, 59 sections 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) are ancillary
to the Act's fundamental purpose of protecting employees in organizational and collective bargaining activity. The Board's record of
success in discouraging the commission of union unfair labor practices directed against individual employees (specifically sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2)) is hardly better than its record against employers, although the number of such charges is relatively small in
relation to the number of charges filed against employers.60
This appraisal of the Board's enforcement record reveals that notwithstanding the substantial number of employers against whom
meritorious unfair labor practice charges have been filed in recent
years, the Board has not protected employees by enforcing the core
provisions of the NLRA effectively. Although the statistical data do
not indicate that all employers who are involved in organizational
campaigns violate the NLRA, such evidence does suggest and tends
to confirm the popular belief61 that nonunion employers are more
concerned with avoidance of the Act's requirements than with compliance with its objectives. The spirit of the NLRA is regularly disregarded in situations in which no violations of specific provisions are
found or even charged. The prevalence of such efforts at union
avoidance, coupled with the Board's dismal record in failing to provide meaningful remedies when violations are found, support the
conclusion that the Board has failed in its primary mission.

or substantial voluntary compliance.
56. See generally 38-46 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 53.
57. NLRA § 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1982) (amended by LMRA, ch. 120, §
101, 61 Stat. 149). See Flanagan, supra note 6, at 979-80.
58. LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982).
59. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
60. See Morris, supra note 32, at 20.
61. See, e.g., F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES (1980).
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NATIONAL LABOR POLICY: AN ASSUMPTION

A question essential to this inquiry is whether the policy of the
Act still represents the nation's true industrial relations policy. If so,

then the core provisions of the statute should be enforced and further
debate should center on the most suitable means of enforcement. On
the other hand, if it is no longer the national policy to encourage free
collective bargaining and affirm the rights of employees to organize,
then we should quit pretending that such is the policy. Moreover,
Congress should quit pretending, and it should reject the Wagner
Act's policy in unambiguous statutory language and repeal or legislatively emasculate its core provisions. But if that were to occur, with
collective bargaining on the wane a marked diminution of employer
incentive to avoid unionization by duplicating or competing with
union conditions would surely follow.

62

The need for representation

or at least protection of employee interests would remain, but other
legal remedies or structures would probably evolve to fill the resulting vacuums: there might be a significant expansion of common-law
wrongful discharge actions with accompanying development of employment at will case law; a series of pervasive statutory regulations
of additional aspects of the employment relationship, at both the
state and federal level, possibly would be enacted; and a new wave of
unionism without the blessing of supporting legislation might even
emerge.
It is not the purpose of this Article to engage in a weighing of
substantive industrial relations policies; I have assumed that the policy contained in the present NLRA is both valid and desirable. Although this assumption is a prerequisite to justifying a search for a
more effective means to enforce the present policy, I have not made
that assumption lightly. Over the years, there have been sufficient
examples of healthy collective bargaining to indicate that the NLRA
system fits comfortably within the general democratic framework of
American political and economic life. Notwithstanding the Board's
bleak record of protecting employee rights, the NLRA, with its emphasis on employee self-determination, offers a suitable framework
for channeling workers' participation into new decisionmaking
processes in matters affecting their legitimate employment-related
interests.6
62. Id. at 154, 341.
63. That framework would be even more suitable were it not for certain Supreme
Court decisions which unnecessarily have restricted the scope and subject matter of collective bargaining. In particular, see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356

Because of the far-reaching changes which have occurred in
American economic life during the last decade, there is a felt need to
find appropriate means to organize industrial relations in a manner
which will maximize productivity. The NLRA is not inappropriate
for that task. The basic structure of the Act was devised with remarkable foresight. Given the proper institutional will, that statute
could furnish the Board with a flexible means to provide positive responses to the demands of the industrial relations community for innovative and improved organizational techniques - some of which
might emphasize cooperative rather than adversarial arrangements
- in order to better cope with the nation's ongoing process of either
deindustrialization or reindustrialization.
Another observation of Freeman and Medoff is pertinent. After
viewing the economic evidence and noting the decline of organized
labor in the United States, a phenomenon which they found unique
among modern democratic industrial societies, they expressed the
following opinion:
We favor legal changes that will make it easier to unionize because we
believe continued decline in unionization is bad not only for unions and
their members but for the entire society. Because our research shows that
unions do much social good, we believe the "union free" economy desired
by some business groups would be a disaster for the country ....

In a well-

functioning labor market, there should be a sufficient number of union and
non-union firms to offer alternative work environments to workers, innovation in workplace rules and conditions, and competition in the market
64

Such legal changes need not be substantive changes; they need only
be changes that will make the present law work the way in which it
was intended.
ENFORCEMENT ALTERNATIVES

If one accepts the premise that the existing primary statutory

mandate is healthy for the country, then one must squarely confront
the harsh evidence of the Board's poor enforcement record. I have
done that, and I have concluded that the Board as presently structured and motivated cannot fulfill its mandate. Therefore the time
has come - indeed it is long overdue - for a drastic overhaul of the
NLRA's enforcement system. Several approaches to accomplishing
this task are worth exploring.
One approach, perhaps the most popular of all, is the one that is
typified by the Labor Law Reform Bill6 5 which failed to pass the
U.S. 342 (1958); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).

64. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 6, at 250.
65. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1883, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978). See 1 C. MORms, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 66-67 (2d ed. 1983).
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Congress in 1978. That approach would amend the NLRA by conferring new powers on the Board and increasing the number of
Board members. But such a palliative simply would pass the buck to
Congress. Such an approach seeks a quick-fix by beefing up the
Board's remedial powers in order to achieve essentially the same ultimate goals which the Board already has the power to accomplish.
It is true that some of the proposed new remedies, for example, selfenforcing Board orders, would be useful additions to the Board's arsenal of weapons; yet, a package of new legislative remedies would
make little difference unless the Board's enforcement philosophy undergoes a marked change. Furthermore, because of the Pandora's
Box syndrome which usually accompanies major efforts to amend
this Act,6" any proposed congressional amendments should be looked
upon with a mixture of skepticism and hesitation. I therefore will not
discuss the various tack-on amendments which have been proposed
to give the Board more clout. The Board first should use the clout
which it already has.
A second approach stems from the recognition that if the Board
inherently cannot, or simply will not, make a genuine effort to use its
present authority effectively, then it should be dismantled - at least
as to its unfair labor practice jurisdiction, in which event a judicial
solution should be given serious consideration. However, transfer of
unfair labor practice jurisdiction to existing federal district courts
would bog down NLRA cases in clogged dockets, and uneven construction of statutory provisions and needless unwieldiness in the enforcement process would surely result. But what could be usefully
considered is the establishment of a specialized federal labor court
capable of functioning with full judicial authority under article III of
the Constitution. Such a court offers numerous advantages. It would
provide instant process and meaningful judicial process, capacity to
require effective compliance with its orders, and an ability to function as a court of equity with orders tailored to meet specific needs.
This solution could be a positive alternative for enforcement of the
unfair labor practice provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act.6 7 The jurisdiction of such a court, however, should not be confined to that Act alone. Ideally, such a court should also have gen-

66. For example, compare the original bill proposed by Senator Kennedy in 1959,
S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., with the final outcome in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act.
See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE

1959, at 1-79 (1959).
67. The labor court alternative, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. See
supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
ACT

OF

eral jurisdiction over all or substantially all other federal labor and
employment laws, including the other provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act, which would mean coverage, inter alia, of the duty of fair representation,68 arbitration under section 301,1 9 and secondary boycott
damage suits under section 303.70 It is also important that the
court's jurisdiction include the Railway Labor Act,71 which presently
suffers from the absence of a centralized decisionmaking authority.72
And the court's jurisdiction should also cover, but not be limited to,
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 3 title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 74 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 75 the Occupational Safety and Health Act,76 and the Fair Labor Standards Act." Because I have discussed the details of such an
article III court elsewhere,78 I shall not repeat them here. Instead,
this Article will focus on a third approach which relies wholly upon
the NLRB and its present statutory authority.
If the latter approach can be viable, it will also be preferable, for
it requires no legislation and no experimentation with the relatively
unknown entity of a new specialized article III court. Utilization of
existing administrative process only requires that the NLRB make a
determined effort to use its existing authority more efficiently. However, this will necessitate some important preconditions, which I
shall discuss in due course. The Board's unused and underused existing authority, to which I refer and about which I shall make some
68. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
69. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982); see also Morris,
Years of
Trilogy: A Celebration,in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRATORS ANDTwenty
JUDGES 331 (J.
Stern & B. Dennis eds. 1980) (proceedings of 33d Annual Meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators).
70. LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982).
71. Railway Labor Act §§ 4-5, 45 U.S.C. §§ 154-155 (1982); see Morris, Procedural Reform in Labor Law - A Preliminary Paper, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 537, 552
(1969) (suggesting that "[t]he absence at the trial court level of a concentration of judicial experience and specialization in law of the Railway Labor Act impedes proper comprehension and efficient enforcement of a complex statute").
72. The National Mediation Board has no jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the
substantive provisions of the Railway Labor Act; accordingly, the federal courts have
that responsibility. See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142
(1969); Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
73. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187, 401-402, 411-415, 431-440, 461-466,
481-483, 501-504, 521-531 (1982).
74. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
75. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631
(1982).
76. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314-5315,
7902; 15 U.S.C. § 633, 636; 18 U.S.C. § 1114; 29 U.S.C. §§ 553, 651-678; 42 U.S.C. §
3142-1 (1982).
77. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 255, 260 (1982).
78. See Morris, Board Procedure,supra note 4; Morris, Article III, supra note 4.
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specific recommendations, includes the following: substantive
rulemaking; streamlining of "R" case procedures; making discovery
available; increasing the use of section 10() injunctions, especially in
discharge cases; reorganization of Administrative Law Judge operations; ordering damage-specific final remedies; and increasing the use
of section 10(e) and 10(f) injunctions. These are the new "tricks"
which the old Board needs to learn.
LABOR BOARD REFORM WITHOUT LEGISLATION

The most plausible antidote for the Board's malaise is to be found
in the potential of the statute itself. Achieving that potential, however, may never be possible. Because of the political nature of Board

appointments, their short five-year terms of office, and the absence of

a strong institutional commitment to vigorous enforcement of the
NLRA, I have little expectation that the Board will ever reform itself. Notwithstanding that slim possibility, this Article will document
certain means by which, in my opinion, the Board's existing authority could be utilized to achieve its major statutory objectives. This
fifty year old Board needs to learn new "tricks." The following discussion will examine those means, which essentially consist of the
activation of several unused or underused procedural devices, a reorganization of certain agency functions, and the employment of more
effective and more injury-specific remedies.
Substantive Rulemaking
Substantive rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure

Act 79 (APA) and section 6 of the NLRA is probably the most im-

portant thing the Board can do to effectuate its process, economize
its time, and advise the people who need to know - most of whom
are not lawyers - what the law requires. It is this last feature, the
information factor, which should be highlighted. Rulemaking has
major advantages, some of which have been admirably treated by
other commentators." Various improvements in agency action which
79. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551559, 701, 706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1982).
80. See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 36-52, 146-47
(1962); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 28198 (1985); R. WILLIAMS, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CoNDuCT 503-05 (1985);

Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Estreicher, supra note 2; Kahn, The NLRB
and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking through Adjudication, 21 UCLA
L. REV. 63 (1975); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor

can result from regular promulgation of substantive rules through
APA notice-and-comment procedures are enumerated below. These
should be measured against the Board's exclusive practice (save for
minor exceptions) 8 ' of using adjudicated cases for such purposes. I
do not mean to suggest that APA rulemaking should be the Board's
only means to effect changes and clarifications in the law. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.82 confirmed that the
"choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies within the Board's
jurisdiction," 88 but it added that "there may be situations where the
Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act."8 4 It is not the purpose of this Article
to define when the Board is legally required to use rulemaking, although some of the illustrations may suggest situations in which the
nature or consequence of a particular rule change may mandate use
of APA procedures. Instead, I propose that because there are inherent advantages in using rulemaking, the Board should choose
rulemaking as its primary discretional device for announcing existing
legal doctrine and promulgating new doctrine. Nonetheless, the
Board should not suddenly attempt to convert to an exclusive
rulemaking system; to be administratively realistic, the conversion
would have to be gradual. But a beginning should be made and future major doctrinal changes, in particular, should receive priority
treatment for promulgation in accordance with APA rulemaking
procedures.
Eleven reasons for the Board to convert to use of substantive
rulemaking are here presented:
Relations Board, 70 YALE LJ. 729 (1961); Peck, A Critique of the National Labor
Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formation: Adjudication and Rulemaking,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968); Shapiro, The Choice of Rule Making or Adjudication In
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Silverman,
The Case for the National Labor Relations Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting
Jurisdiction,25 LAB. LJ. 607 (1974); Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board:
The Casefor Making Rules on Collective BargainingUnits, 32 LAB. L.J. 105 (1981).

81. In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), the Supreme Court
reviewed the Board's application of the rule adopted in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), and concluded that the Board had engaged in rulemaking without complying with the requirements of the APA. However, the Court later held that the
NRLB is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding
and that the choice is within the Board's discretion. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267 (1974). In the years between Wyman-Gordon and Bell Aerospace, the Board
conducted three unprecedented rulemaking proceedings. These instances included promulgation of standards for the exercise of jurisdiction over private colleges and universities and over symphony orchestras with gross annual revenues from all sources of not less
than one million dollars. The Board ruled in another proceeding that it would not assert
jurisdiction over the horse-racing and dog-racing industries. See 2 C. MoRRis, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1631 nn. 214-16 (2d ed. 1983).
82. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
83. Id. at 293.
84. Id. at 294.

[VOL. 24: 9, 1987]

NLRB Reform
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

1. General language in the statute. The Act is written in broad
and general language. Congress left to the Board the responsibility
of defining legal detail in accordance with legislative policy. As the
85
Supreme Court noted in Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, "to accomplish the task which Congress set for it, [the Board] necessarily
must have authority to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions""6 of the NLRA. Rulemaking is ideally suited for that purpose. The Board therefore should make use of the express authority
contained in section 6 "to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner
prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and
regulations as may be necessary ato carry out the provisions of [the
National Labor Relations Act] .11
2. Rulemaking is a source of necessary data. Case-by-case adjudication does not provide the Board with the necessary factual data or
the best available analyses of such data on which to premise rules of
broad application. In adjudicated cases, even those in which the
Board announces major policy changes, oral argument rarely is permitted and amidi briefs rarely are invited. By contrast, the rulemaking process invites a dialogue between the labor relations community
and the Board, for the notice-and-comment procedure contemplated
by the APA encourages the parties who are likely to be affected by a
proposed rule to submit relevant data and argument which the Board
must consider. 88 To merit the "expert" label that Congress intended
and which the courts are expected to acknowledge,89 the Board needs
an adequate research source; presently such is not available either
through the adjudicative process or through the Board's limited statutory appointment authority.9 0 Under rulemaking procedures, data
85.
86.

(1945).

437 U.S. 483 (1978).
Id. at 501; see also Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798

87. NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
88. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33 (1964); U.S. v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Bureau, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). As Professor Estreicher has noted:
Rulemaking ensures a level of public participation in the policymaking process
not currently available. The opportunity for public participation is automatic
with each notice of rulemaking, and open to all concerned. Hopefully, the various organizations representing employees, unions and management will in time
develop rulemaking staff... who will vigilantly monitor and contribute to the
rulemaking process.
Estreicher, supra note 2, at 177.
89. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
90. NLRA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1982).

which are submitted by the public will tend to reflect diverse points
of view, and the accuracy and objectivity of raw data can be tested
and debated in the submission and consideration process. Lacking
such a process, the Board often displays an "ivory tower" syndrome,
which Samuel Estreicher perceptively characterized as "typically intuitionistic and excessively doctrinal." 91
3. Adjudicative rulemaking emphasizes specific facts rather than
broad legislativepolicy. Rules promulgated in litigated cases usually
are contained in decisions which are long on the facts of the particular case but short on the facts and reasons which would justify adoption of the broad rule being promulgated. For example, in its 1958
Mountain Pacific92 decision, the Board merely asserted that it was
reasonable to infer that exclusive hiring hall authority to refer employees "enhances the union's power and control over the employment status" 93 and that this results in "the inherent and unlawful
encouragement of union membership;" 94 whereupon the Board
promulgated a rule requiring the insertion of specific protective language intended to be applicable to all exclusive hiring halls. But in
Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB,9 5 the Supreme Court reversed the
Board, noting that the rule implied the existence of discrimination
under sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) without any showing of discrimination. But, had the Board designed a more carefully crafted hiring
hall rule, perhaps under section 8(b)(1)(A) alone, and had the Board
based it at least in part on empirical data obtained in an APA
rulemaking proceeding, and had it provided an articulated rationale
derived from such data, would the Court have invalidated it? Perhaps not.
An example in which the Board emphasized the facts of the particular case while virtually ignoring facts and accompanying rationale pertinent to the broad rule being promulgated was the decision in
Rossmore House.9 ° That case concerned interrogation of a known
91. Estreicher, supra note 2, at 172. Professor Estreicher colorfully describes the
process:
Rather than providing a basis for decisions that only a supposedly expert
agency could make - by evaluating the available empirical, economic literature and systematically distilling the accumulated experience of Board personnel and of the labor relations community generally - the Board acts as a kind
of Article I "Talmudist" court, parcing precedent, divining the true meaning of
some Supreme Court ruling, balancing in some mysterious fashion competing,
yet absolute-sounding values.
Id.

92. 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1958), rev'd, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
93. Id. at 896.
94. Id. at 897.
95. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
96. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984), affid, 760 F.2d 1006 (1985). The "emphasis on
what may well be idiosyncratic specific facts diverts the agency's attention from the
broad policy implications of the rule under consideration." R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P.
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union adherent. The Board used the occasion to reverse a rule which
a prior Board had announced in P.P.G. Industries.9 7 Not surprisingly, the P.P.G. Board had been equally guilty of failing to spell out
its findings and rationale. The Board in P.P.G., relying on various
prior decisions, 98 concluded that an employer's inquiries about an
employee's union, sentiments, regardless of the fact that the employee had been open and active in his support of the union, reasonably tends to coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights
because it "conveys an employer's displeasure with an employee's
union activity. . . ." The Board in Rossmore House adopted an
entirely new rule to the effect that interrogation about union sentiments, whether of a known union adherent or any other employee,
would be unlawful only if "under all the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with"100 section 7 rights. It also suggested in a footnote 0 1 some of the factors
which may be considered in analyzing alleged interrogations; but nowhere did the Board provide an explanation of why employer interrogation about union activity would not presumptively coerce, or at
the very least interfere with, the employee's organizational rights, or
why the employer would have any legitimate need or reason under
ordinary circumstances10 2 to make the inquiry. Whether it was a
Carter Board contemplating the P.P.G. rule or a Reagan Board contemplating the Rossmore House rule, APA rulemaking would have
required the Board to receive and consider proffered empirical data
and other input from the industrial relations community on the effects of employer interrogation during a union organizing campaign.
Another prime example of the need to articulate the reasoning behind a substantive rule and the inadequacy of the adjudicative process for that purpose may be found in the Board's recent quandary
over the Meyers rule. 10 3 The employee in the case had been dissupra note 80, at 283.
97. 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980).
98. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. - Wire & Cable Div., 241 N.L.R.B. 1091 (1979);
Paceco, a Div. of Fruehauf Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 399 (1978); ITT Automotive Elec.
Prods. Div., 231 N.L.R.B. 878 (1977).
99. P.P.G. Industries, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1147.
100. Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1177-78.
101. Id. at 1178 n.20.
102. See, e.g., Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770 (1964), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
103. Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB,
755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 313 (1985), on remand, 281
N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1986).
VERKUIL,

charged from his employment as a truck driver because of his safety
complaints and his refusal to drive an unsafe truck after reporting its
unsafe condition to a state public safety agency. Inasmuch as no
union was involved, the case raised the issue of the rule enunciated
in Alleluia Cushion Co.,10 which would have treated such conduct
as protected constructive concerted activity under section 7. The
Reagan Board chose Meyers as its adjudicative vehicle to overturn
the Alleluia rule; indeed, it went even further and announced a
broad rule defining situations which were not covered by the Meyers
facts. 105 Oral argument and amici briefs were not invited, nor was
the public informed of any proposed new rule, as would have been
required under APA procedures.
On review of the Board's decision, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration. Judge Harry Edwards' majority opinion explained that the
Board had erred in holding (1) that its construction of the rule was
"mandated by the statute," (2) that the new rule imposed requirements in addition to that required for reversal of Alleluia, which was
the only rationale the Board provided for its action, and (3) that the
decision "contains not a word of justification for its new standard in
terms of the policies of the statute." 10 8 Following remand, the Board
requested the parties to provide statements of position, but it did not
appeal generally for public input,107 nor did it permit oral argument.
The Board thus issued a new rule by the adjudicative process without benefit of any empirical data and with virtually no input from
the persons and parties likely to be affected by the rule.108 The per104. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
105. Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496-97. The new rule announced in the case was as
follows:
In general, to find an employee's activity to be 'concerted,' we shall require
that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not
solely by and on behalf of the employee himself. Once the activity is found to
be concerted, an 8(a)(1) violation will be found if, in addition, the employer
knew of the concerted nature of the employee's actiyity, the concerted activity
was protected by the Act, and the adverse employment action at issue (e.g.,
discharge) was motivated by the employee's protected concerted activity.
Id. at 497. See infra note 108.

106. Prill, 755 F.2d at 950. The court relied principally on SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80 (1943). See also FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94
(1953); Prill, 755 F.2d at 957.

107. 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 2 n.8. Even the discharged employee's
counsel, that is, the NLRB General Counsel, had now abandoned his case, for the present General Counsel took the position that Prill's protest was not protected concerted
activity, therefore his discharge did not violate the statute. General Counsel's Statement
of Position on Remand filed by General Counsel Rosemary Collyer in Case No. 7-CA17207 (268 N.L.R.B. No. 73), Sept. 27, 1985; see also Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 730, at
4 (Feb. 14, 1986). However, the Board did accept an amicus brief supporting the charging party's position. 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 3 n.9.
108. In its decision following remand, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1986) (Meyers 11),
the Board succeeded both in expanding the original Meyers (Meyers 1)concept of con-
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sons who will be most affected will be nonunion employees who may
engage in conduct, knowingly or unknowingly, that may get them
discharged. Those are the persons for whom the core provisions of
the statute were intended.
Employees, as well as their employers, need to know the rules
which govern protected concerted activity by nonrepresented employees; for without that knowledge, such rules only invite entrapment
for not only the outspoken but also for the unwary employee, who
might get himself discharged, and for the employer, who might unknowingly commit an unfair labor practice by threatening or order-

ing an employee's discharge.
APA rulemaking would provide the Board with a means to ascer-

tain what really happens in the work place -

not just what hap-

pened at the one establishment involved in the case. Rulemaking
would also provide a means for the Board to receive informed and
diverse opinion on the subject, after which it would have an opportu-

nity to consider relevant data and various points of view. The end
product should be a rule for which the Board is able to provide an
adequate rationale, as the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals required in its Meyers remand.
certed activity for mutual aid or protection and in compounding the confusion surrounding the meaning of that rule; for it stated that it was adhering to the definition of concerted activity set forth in Meyers I, but it also redefined the meaning and intent of the
Meyers I rule. See supra note 105. The Meyers decisions are thus classic examples of the
inadequacy of the adjudicative rulemaking process.
In Meyers II, by way of "clarification," the Board, in effect, rewrote the Meyers I rule
by adding the following glosses: "There is nothing in the Meyers I definition which states
that conduct engaged in by a single employee at one point in time can never constitute
concerted activity within the meaning of Section 7." Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118,
slip op. at 11. "When the record evidence demonstrates group activities, whether 'specifically authorized' in a formal agency sense, or otherwise, we shall find the conduct to be
concerted." Id. at 13. "[O]ur definition of concerted activity in Meyers I encompasses
those circumstances where individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare
for group action, as well as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the
attention of management." Id. at 15. "[1]ndividual activity 'looking toward group action'
is deemed concerted." Id. at 16 (quoting Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840,
844-45 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The foregoing changes in the Meyers rule (coupled with changes in Board membership) were so significant that the Board's subsequent decision in Every Woman's Place,
Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1986), Chairman Dotson, dissenting, suggests that if Prill's
case were now being decided under the Meyers II construction of Meyers I, Prill would
be reinstated to employment because he had discussed safety problems with other employees, see Prill,755 F.2d at 943, and because another employee who drove Prill's truck
told the supervisor in Prill's presence that he would not drive it again until it was repaired. Id. Thus, Prill's report of safety problems to state authorities would seem to have
been "sufficiently linked to group activity to constitute concerted activity," as was the
case in Every Woman's Place, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48, slip op. at 2.

4. Rulemaking reduces litigation. Development of doctrine
through the adjudicative process emphasizes fact-oriented decisionmaking and encourages parties to take risks and test the outer limits
of the law. It thus provides minimal incentive for voluntary compliance and settlement. Looking back on half a century of the adjudicative process in action, it truly can be said that adjudication begets
adjudication. On the other hand, rulemaking can provide a greater
measure of stability and uniformity. Yet, rulemaking need not be
synonymous with rigidity. As Merton Bernstein noted seventeen
years ago in his seminal article on NLRB rulemaking, "the rigors of
rule making uniformity can be ameliorated by interpretation in adjudication, while the mere existence of a rule will forestall many potential cases or provide the basis for summary disposition of many
others."10 9
5. Rulemaking uses agency resources more efficiently. With the
Board's overcrowded docket and the lengthy delays which characterize most "C" cases and many "R" cases, the Board should welcome
rulemaking as a means to expedite the case-handling process. The
wheel need not be reinvented in every case, yet the Board stands
helpless while the same types of unfair labor practice situations move
repetitively and slowly through the decisional process.1 10 Clear substantive rules would allow many of those cases to be handled summarily. And for "R" cases, one cannot seriously dispute the fact that
almost all bargaining unit determinations 'could be reduced to specific rules."" If that were to happen, the need for contested on-therecord hearings would vanish in most "R" cases. Again, it should be
noted that in exceptional cases the Board would not be bound by the
straight-jacket of inflexible rules, for the agency is empowered both
to interpret rules and to make exceptions to rules whenever warranted by significant factual differences.
6. Effect on appellate review. Rulemaking should improve the
Board's appellate image. Doctrinal changes backed by adequate data
109. Bernstein, supra note 80, at 592.
110. See 27-48 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 53, app. table 2. Professors Pierce,
Shapiro and Verkuil conclude that determining broad rules through adjudication is
grossly inefficient:
First, when formal adjudication is used as a means of exploring the many effects of a proposed rule, a single proceeding can be very expensive and timeconsuming. . .. Second, the expensive process of formal adjudication may
have to be repeated in subsequent cases. . . .Third, rules of conduct extracted
from an adjudication tend to be considerably less clear in scope and content
than rules that result from rulemaking.
R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRo & P. VERKUIL, supra note 80, at 283-84.
111. See Determinationsof Scope of Unit, in CLASSIFIED INDEX OF DECISIONS OF
THE REGIONAL DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IN REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS (Dec. 1976, Dec. 1981, Jan. 1984, and Dec. 1984 eds.); see also

Subrin, supra note 80.
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derived from broad public input, accompanied by a well reasoned
statement of the basis for the rule, would provide the courts with
evidence of genuine agency expertise to which they should be more
likely to defer.1 12 Furthermore, the existence of an APA-promulgated rule would tend to focus the reviewing process upon policy and
statutory interpretation rather than upon the facts peculiar to the
individual cases. If the Board commands greater respect in the
courts, then it also may command greater respect in the industrial
relations community which it was created to serve.
7. The prevention factor. Rulemaking would allow the Board to
emphasize the prevention of unfair labor practices rather than
merely the remedying of violations. For one to comply with the law
voluntarily, one first needs to know what the law requires. Rulemaking permits the Board to react swiftly to a perceived need without
having to rely on delay and haphazard chance to produce the
rulemaking opportunity. As Professor Bernstein observed, "[r]ule
making provides the agency with the opportunity to initiate changes
in its own doctrine, whereas adjudication leaves the initiative to the
few private parties who have the resources, the hardheadedness, or
the innocence to persevere in the litigation process."11 3
8. Rulemaking provides a more suitable medium for articulation
of reasoning behind rules. Reliance on rulemaking as the vehicle of
major shifts in policy provides a more appropriate medium for the
agency to justify its action. The APA specifies that the agency shall
incorporate in the rule "a concise general statement of [its] basis
and purpose. 1 11 4 Aside from the obvious utility of this requirement
from the standpoint of the users of the rule, this "basis and purpose"
statement also may be essential to the process of judicial review. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals noted in PortlandCement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus: "It is not consonant with the purpose of
a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of inade112. For example, see the Report of the Judicial Conference and Report of the
Admin. Office 1973-1983, wherein statistical compilations for the years 1961-1977 indicate that labor and employment discrimination cases approximate 12-16% of the entire
federal court docket. Labor cases have increased steadily each year, from 2484 in 1961,
to 7739 in 1977. Civil rights cases, including employment discrimination, have increased
from 296 in 1961, to 13,113 in 1977. The majority of the federal court civil docket
consists of contract and tort actions, including personal and marine injury cases, which,
combined, account for approximately 40% of all federal court cases. The remainder of
the docket consists of various statutory actions.
113. Bernstein, supra note 80, at 590-91.
114. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).

quate data, or on data that.

. .

is known only to the agency."115 It

is obviously much easier to change a rule by adjudication than by
notice-and-comment rulemaking. But rulemaking would at least encourage and possibly require the Board to explain, with reference to
the intent of the law but without reference to the facts of a specific
case, why a particular policy shift is needed.
9. Rulemaking assists the Congress in its oversight responsibilities. If Congress should disagree with a substantive action of the
Board, the offensive rule can be identified with precision and
changed by specific legislative amendment if it is deemed contrary to
contemporary congressional intent. This "watchdog potential" in
rulemaking may serve to keep an agency aware that Congress is
watching; the existence of specific APA rules also may make it easier to change the law without butchering the entire statute.,,
10. The General Counselfactor. Two features relating to the peculiar role of the General Counsel under the NLRA tend to inhibit
the Board's capacity for fully effective rulemaking when it exclusively utilizes the adjudicative process. Unlike other federal agencies,
the Labor Board and its General Counsel are separate entities,117
and the General Counsel's discretion to refuse to issue a complaint is
unreviewable.1 28 These factors make it virtually impossible, or at
least awkward, for the Board to initiate doctrinal changes that are
likely to result in the imposition of substantial monetary liability. A
good example of this is the Mackay'" "rule" increasingly used by
many companies to replace union employees with nonunion personnel, thereby divesting the incumbent union of its bargaining rights.
This well-known rule recognizes the right of an employer to make
permanent replacements of striking employees during an economic
strike. This rule was never actually "promulgated" by the Board,
115. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 173-74 (2d ed. 1984).
116. For example, in 1974 Congress was able to pinpoint a rule with which it disagreed and thereafter repeal it without affecting the statute as a whole. See Regulation
of Dep't of Transp. Providing for Ignition Interlock of Automobile Seatbelts, 37 Fed.
Reg. 13,265 (1972) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208). The regulation was repealed by
the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492,
§ 109, 88 Stat. 1470, 1482.
117. NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982) (added by LMRA, ch. 120, § 101,
61 Stat. 139); see Rodgers, Later History and Development of the N.L.R.B., 29 GEO.
WAsH L. REV. 252, 261-65 (1960); see also M. MCCLINTOCK, NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL -

UNREVIEWABLE POWER TO ISSUE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT 10-19

(1980).
118. George Banta Co. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1080 (1981); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); M. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 117; 2 C. MORRIS, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1696-97 (2d ed. 1983).
119. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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either in an adjudicated case or through APA rulemaking; it was
derived from language in dictum 120 contained in the Supreme
Court's 1938 decision in the Mackay case. The Board never enunciated a formal reason for the rule, nor did it ever explain why permanent replacements, as distinguished from temporary replacements,
are always essential to the employer's operation of its business during a strike. 12 ' Even if the Board wanted to change the Mackay rule,
under an adjudicative rulemaking system it would be difficult if not

impossible to do so. If a charge were filed alleging that an employer

had violated section 8(a)(3) by permanently replacing strikers,
thereby causing permanent economic damage to the union members
and destruction of the bargaining relation, the General Counsel
would be expected to dismiss such a charge and the Board would not
have the opportunity to rethink the rule. Indeed, even if the General

Counsel should choose to initiate a change in the rule by issuing a

complaint, the potential backpay liability which the employer would
face would be so great that the Board's retroactive imposition of the
rule change would probably represent an abuse of administrative dis-

cretion and a violation of due process, such as the Supreme Court

had in mind in its Bell Aerospace caveat.1 22 But if the rule change

were not made retroactively applicable in the subject case, what happens to the rights of the displaced employees and the union that has

lost its majority? The only reasonable answer to this quandary -

and the quandary also could apply to any other contemplated rule
change which would impose more restrictive penalties than presently
120. Id. at 614.
121. In 1967 the Supreme Court issued its decision in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), which stated that "if it can reasonably be concluded that
the employer's discriminatory conduct was 'inherently destructive' of important employee
rights," despite evidence of legitimate business motivation and the absence of proof of
anti-union motivation, the employer could be found in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3). Id. at 34. In view of the "inherently destructive" impact of permanent replacements on unionized employees and the collective bargaining process, a strong case can be
made that an employer should be required to prove that it cannot operate its struck
business with temporary replacements before it could legally justify the hiring of permanent replacements during a strike. The Board in fact does require that only temporary
replacements be used during offensive lockouts. See Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440
F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Intercollegiate Press v. NLRB,
486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Bookbinders Local 60 v. NLRB,
416 U.S. 938 (1974); cf. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1976), enforcement denied, 557 F.2d 1126, (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Oil Workers v.
NLRB, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). During a period of high unemployment it is especially
likely that ample numbers of job applicants would accept temporary employment. Cf.
Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (1986).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.

exist - is rulemaking in accordance with APA procedures. The
proper way would be for the Board to announce in advance its proposed rule change, and thereafter it would receive, through noticeand-comment procedures, empirical data and opinion from the 1vari23
ous constituencies who would be affected by the proposed rule.
11. Informationfactor. The information factor in rulemaking is of
special importance to an agency whose primary coverage extends to
millions of individual employees with levels of education and sophistication that range from illiterate, unskilled, and naive at one end of
the spectrum, to highly educated, professional, and astute at the
other. Adequate dissemination of substantive rules to persons whose
employment can be affected by those rules is a critical but missing
element in the task of the NLRB. The following sampling of suggested rules contains many illustrations of the function and importance of rules as conveyers of essential legal information.
a. Posting a general notice of the Act's basic requirements (in
English and other appropriate languages). Such a rule should be
posted on employee and union members' bulletin boards by all employers and unions subject to the Board's jurisdiction. Why has the
Board avoided taking this simple but important step toward informing employees of their rights under the Act? Most employees do not
know what the NLRB does or what the law requires. I suspect that,
except for those persons who have had personal experience with collective bargaining or have been involved in a union election campaign, the overwhelming majority of adults in the United States and an even greater number of employees affected by the NLRA do not know what the NLRB does or that union organizational
rights realistically can be protected. I also suspect that a surprisingly
incisive
large number have never even heard of the NLRB. One
study of personnel policies in large nonunion companies1 24 revealed
that a number of those companies maintain employee committees,
plans, or grievance procedures which appear to qualify as labor organizations within the meaning of the NLRA.1 25 Many of those companies may be in violation of the section 8(a)(2) prohibition against
employer support or domination of such entities. And most of the
employees involved in those plans do not know what their legal rights
123. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. For another example of the
pernicious effect of the "General Counsel factor," see Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1973), in which the Supreme Court, in the context of
an antitrust action, promulgated a new rule under section 8(e) of the NLRA - the "hot
cargo" provision - despite the fact that the Board had not previously passed on the rule,
for the General Counsel had refused to issue a complaint when the charge was filed.
Only thereafter did the charging party file his antitrust action in federal court. See 2 C.
MoRais, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1231-34 (2d ed. 1983).

124.
125.

F. FOULKES, supra note 61.

NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
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are, and if they did, they probably would not know how to enforce
them.
The same lack of information, with the same corresponding need,
is characteristic of employees and prospective employees at almost
every company where employees are not represented by a union. To
put it bluntly, most employees do not believe that they cannot be
fired or adversely affected if they engage in even the mildest and
most "protected" forms of union activity. But not only do working
employees need to know their rights and how to inquire about possible statutory violations or representation procedures, prospective employees -

that is, job applicants -

also need to know about their

rights.
As Justice Frankfurter reminded us long ago in Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB,' 26 "discrimination in hiring is twin to discrimination
in firing. 127 A general posting of NLRA rights and procedures
would help provide the needed information, for it is just as unlawful
for a new automotive employer in Tennessee to deny employment to
an experienced laid-off auto worker from Detroit on account of his
union membership as it would be to fire an existing employee for the
same reason. But without the benefit of a clearly posted rule to that
effect to remind the job interviewer and the applicant, the Phelps
Dodge rule will rarely be enforced.
advising of
Notices can be found on employee bulletin boards
128
rights under other federal laws, such as title VII, the Fair Labor
130
Standards Act,' 29 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. A
general NLRB notice should also contain an "800" telephone numother federal
ber for hot-line information, a service which some
13' It should not be
public.
agencies presently make available to the
3 2 The Board certainly could
is.'
it
but
NLRB,
the
reach
to
difficult
do more to advertise its services- that is, if it really wanted to.
126. 313 U.S. 177 (1940).
127. Id. at 187.
259, 42
128. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat.
(1982).
2000e
§
U.S.C.
also 29
129. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1982); see
C.F.R. § 694.2 (1985).
see
130. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1982);
(1985).
(2)
1903.2(a)(1),
§
C.F.R.
also 29
"hot-line"
131. As an example, the Environmental Protection Agency maintains a
number, 1-(800)-424-9346, for the reporting of hazardous waste occurences. NLRB re132. For instance, in Dallas if an employee wanted to call the nearest easy, for
not be
gional office, a long distance call would be required. But even that would the employee
fact,
In
directory.
local
the
in
found
be
not
the telephone number would
in Fort Worth.
would have no convenient way of knowing that the regional office was

b. Organizationalcampaign rules. Organizational rules should be
spelled out clearly, and then made available to employees, unions,
and employer representatives, including supervisors. These rules
presently exist in a plethora of decisions. Attorneys usually can find
them, but not always quickly. Affected employees, however, may
never learn about them until it is too late. Many of the present adjudicated rules are fact-oriented, such as the one discussed in Rossmore House, so that they do not really prevent unlawful conduct.
Accordingly, the Board should promulgate clearly understandable
rules relating to such subjects as campaign misrepresentation;33access to the employer's premises by union organizers and employees
(both on-duty and off-duty); 34 solicitation and distribution of union
authorizations and literature; 185 interrogationand polling as to employees' union sentiments or activity;13 8 permissible activity by employers, including supervisors;1 37 and, prohibitions relating to union
promises and grants of benefits.138
c. Engaging in concerted activity for "mutual aid or protec-

tion."189 These rules are particularly important for employees in
nonunion establishments, for such persons ordinarily will not have
access to a union as a source of information. And Weingarten14o
rules also should be made available to employees directly because
they must be invoked by the employee involved, not by the employee's union.141
d. Defining labor organizations under section 2(5) of the NLRA
and rules relating to employer domination, support, and assistance
to labor organizations under section 8(a)(2). As previously noted,
133. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982); Shopping
Kart Food
Mkt., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
134. See, e.g., NLRB v. Knogo Corp., 727 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1984);
Harvey's
Wagon Wheel, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1978).
135. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, (1978); Eastex,
Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468 U.S. 793 (1945);
(10th Cir. 1983);
NLRB v. Jack August Enters., 583 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1978); Our Way,
268 N.L.R.B.
No. 61 (1984).
136. See, e.g., Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984), afld, 760
F.2d 1006
(1985); Midwest Stock Exch., Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.
1980); P.S.C.
Resources, Inc. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 380 (Ist Cir. 1978); NLRB v. J.P.
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); Stormer, Inc., Div. of Fuqua Indus., Inc., 268Stevens Co., 563
N.L.R.B. 860
(1984); Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
137. See, e.g., M.A.N. Truck & Bus Corp., 272 N.L.R.B. 1279 (1984)
(additional
paid holidays allowed); Pickering & Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1981) (supervisor's
threat
of plant closure unlawful despite repudiation by company president).
138. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1974).
139. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
140. See NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
141. Id.; see also 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 149-56 (2d
ed.
1983).
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1 42
these rules are especially important in nonunion establishments.
And rules relating to lawful recognition of labor organizations, derived from the Supreme Court's decision in International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann), " also
should be promulgated and made widely available, thereby advising
employees and employers how they can lawfully achieve recognition
of an employee plan, committee, or other labor organization.
e. Employees' Rights. Rules should be posted regarding union rep144
resentation, including the union's duty of fair representation,
rights regarding union security,14 5 check-off of union dues, 146 hiring
halls,1 47 and rights concerning resignations from union membership
in relation to strikes.1 48 All of these rules relate to day-to-day conduct at unionized establishments and at union halls and offices.
Clear notice of such rules would facilitate compliance with their requirements and thereby reduce the level of contested litigation.
f. Defining appropriatebargainingunits. A comprehensive set of
rules to define appropriate bargaining units should be established.
The existence of such rules would 1greatly
assist in speeding up the
49
representation and election process.
The foregoing list is not intended to be complete, but it is especially illustrative of those rules for which the information factor is
important. For the most part, these are rules which employees and
employers need to know regardless of the availability of lawyers. The
NLRA has become too much the exclusive domain of lawyers. Lawyers always should have and always will have an important role to
play in the administration and enforcement of this Act, but they
should not dominate the stage. The promulgation and dissemination

142.

See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.

143. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).

144. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944); Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967);

Local Union No. 12 Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1967).
145.

See, e.g., Teamsters Local 46 (Port Distributing Corp.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1175

(1978); Plasterers Local 32, 223 N.L.R.B. 486 (1976).
146. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
147. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961);
Asbestos Workers, Local 80, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 171 (1984).
148. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
149. See S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1978) (reference to
rulemaking for unit determination in legislative history of the Labor Reform Bill of
1978); St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 954-55, 958 (1984) (favorable discussion
in the concurring opinion of Member Dennis and the dissenting opinion of Member Zimmerman); see also NLRB v. Hillview Health Care Center, 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th
Cir. 1983). See supra note 110.

of clear substantive rules would help to return the Act to the primary players, that is, employees, employers, and union
representatives.
Streamlining of "'R"case procedures
The representation and election process can be expedited by the
use of two interrelated devices: (1) rulemaking, particularly rules
defining appropriate bargaining units, as noted above; and (2) show
cause or summary judgment hearings. The NLRA does not specify
the nature of the hearing required by section 9(c)(1)(B) except that
it must be "appropriate." There is no requirement that a full hearing
be held regardless of the existence of bona fide contested issues. 150
"Show cause" and "summary judgment" procedures, especially
when coupled with rules relating to bargaining units, could reduce
substantially the incidence of "live" on-the-record hearings.151 Other
agencies have enjoyed outstanding success in using written submissions in routine cases;152 the Board could use similar procedures in
most "R" cases.

Making Discovery Available
Interrogatories, depositions, prehearing subpoenas, and other discovery devices, when used under proper supervision, could facilitate
the enforcement process. The unreviewable discretion of the General
Counsel to issue complaints and dismiss unfair labor practice
charges can be justified under strict due process standards 53 only if
all reasonable efforts are made, or made available, for gathering evidence relating to a charge filed in good faith. It is indeed strange for
a law enforcement agency to operate with a self-imposed handicap
such as the Board's limitation on compulsory discovery process. The
greater the likelihood of law violators being prosecuted (which in
NLRB parlance of course means having a complaint issued), the less
the incentive for violations to occur. Discovery can be a means to
ferret out evidence that the charging party or regional attorney has
reason to believe is there but is unobtainable without compulsory
150. Cf. United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Judge Skelly Wright opined that "[the] requirement of a hearing in a
proceeding before an administrative agency may be satisfied by something less time-consuming than courtroom drama." Id. at 537 (quoting Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v.
FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 589 (1969)).
151. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); Federal Power Comm'n v.
Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192 (1956).
152. See P. ROTHCHILD & C. KOTCH, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 162-69 (1981); Cooper Labs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 501 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
153. Cf. Mathew v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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process.
Discovery will also facilitate the settlement of cases. A high settlement rate is consistent with vigorous enforcement of the Act, but
only if the achieved settlements produce remedies and compliance
consistent with the Act's objectives. This requires a realistic appraisal of available evidence by both sides. Discovery can lead not
only to settlement but also to shorter hearings. Both results are
desirable.
The often expressed fear that employees will be intimidated
through depositions is groundless. Discovery can be controlled and
protected, and witnesses who testify in depositions are more visible
and thus less likely to be targets of discrimination because of their
visibility. Discovery should not be granted without restrictions, however, for discovery indeed can be abused. 154 The process can be regulated and protected by requiring a showing of reasonable need for
are the logithe discovery device sought. Administrative Law Judges
155
protection.
and
oversight
such
provide
to
persons
cal
Increasingthe Use of Section 10(j) Injunctions, Especially in
Discharge Cases
The Taft-Hartley Congress was mindful of the Board's need for
speedy injunctive relief for "all types of unfair labor practices, 156
not just for secondary activity for which section 10(l) 157 mandatory
injunctions were provided. Section 10(j) therefore was written into
the Act to provide interim relief pending final Board action. It was
contained in the original Senate Committee bil 1 58 for which the
Committee Report noted that "the Board need not wait, if the circumstances call for [injunctive] relief, until it has held a hearing
[and] issued its order. .... ,"159 Nevertheless, 10(j) injunctions were
154. See Report of Federal Procedure Committee, Litigation Section, American
Bar Association 1984-85 (containing a survey which "confirms the federal courts' broad
range of powers to sanction improper ... discovery... and the courts' willingness to
use that power to punish and deter abuses in the litigation process"); cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (superseded by statute, as stated in Hagerty v.
Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217 (1984), cert. denied sub. nom Hagerty v. Keller,
106 S. Ct. 333 (1985); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639 (1976).
155. See infra text accompanying note 170.
156. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
AcT, 1947, at 414 (1948).
157. NLRA § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1982).
158. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess (1947).
159.

1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

AcT, 1947, at 433 (1948).

little used during the early Taft-Hartley years, but their use gradually increased, and their record of success has been outstanding. 6 0
The 10(j) device received its strongest boost from General Counsel
John Irving in his 1979 memorandum report 61 on section 10(j) utilization, which still provides the basic guidelines for these actions. Irving appraised the device as follows:
I strongly believe that Section 10(j) is an important tool for accomplishing

the remedial purposes of the Act. The timely use of such injunction proceedings in appropriate circumstances permits maintenance of the status
quo ante to assure that the Board's final order, when entered, will not be a
nullity. It provides a means for assuring that the remedial purposes of the
Act will not be frustrated by the delays inherent in the statutory framework
for litigation.8 2

That report provided a statistical analysis which demonstrated
how useful and successful the device could be. It examined 175 cases
in which petitions for injunctions had been filed. Of the 175 cases,
the objectives of the 10(j) proceedings were accomplished in whole
or in substantial part in 142 cases, or eighty-one percent. Of these
142 cases, eighty-two were concluded with a settlement of the 10(j)
aspects of the case (and in the great majority of these, the underlying Board case was also settled).1 63 In the other sixty cases, an injunction was obtained, albeit in some instances the court did not
grant the full extent of affirmative relief sought by the Board.1 64
General Counsel Irving noted that what was most striking about
those statistics was "the high settlement rate," 1 5 for in all of those
cases the respondent previously had shunned the Region's efforts to
obtain a settlement.
Although the Board filed seventy-three section 10(j) actions in the
district courts in 1979, many more, even hundreds more, could have
been filed. This is not a criticism of Irving's 100) stewardship; on
the contrary, he deserves commendation because he demonstrated
what could be done with this versatile remedial device. But even
more can be done.
10(j) injunctions should be used almost routinely in discharge
cases, particularly when the discharge occurs in the context of an
organizational campaign. This would not flood the courts. Instead,
once it has been demonstrated that the remedy is available and likely
to be used, an employer will perceive no advantage in discharging
160. See Irving, Report on Utilization of Section IOU) Injunction Proceedings
July 1,1975, Through June 20, 1979, NLRB-GC MEMORANDUM 79-77 (1979); Nash,
Report on 10j) Proceedings August 1971-July 1, 1975, NLRB-GC MEMORANDUM, August 14, 1975.

161.
162.
163.
164.

See Irving, supra note 160.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4 n.3.
Id. at 4.

165. Id. at 5.
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union activists. In fact, the judicially enforced return of such an employee prior to an election would be counterproductive to the employer's campaign. The 10(j) injunction is thus an important preventive measure. But even after the injunction complaint is filed in
court, experience demonstrates that the case is as likely to settle as it
is to go to trial. And experience under the Railway Labor Act, where
injunctions against section 8(a)(3) type conduct presently are available, suggests that such availability of quick judicial process' tends
to discourage illegal discharges.
The potential of section 10() has hardly been touched. It can be
used against any kind of unfair labor practice, both against unions
and against employers, as well as whenever the Board's ordinary
remedy is too late or otherwise inadequate. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Eisenberg ex rel. NLRB v. Wellington Hall Nursing
Home167 recognized the importance of this temporary injunctive
remedy: "When the Board files an application for [10(j)] relief it is
not acting on behalf of individual employees but in the public interest . .

.

.That interest is the integrity of the collective bargaining

process."' 16 8
The statute requires that 10(j) injunctions be authorized by the
Board. Thus, the General Counsel first must request the authorization, and if and when it is granted (and it almost always is granted),
the General Counsel proceeds to file the action in court. The present
loosely-structured procedure is awkward,"6 9 but such awkwardness is
only the product of the long-time failure of the Board and General
Counsel to make a combined effort to streamline the process. 10(j)
cases could move almost as fast as 10(l) cases, provided the Board
and the General Counsel want to achieve that result.
The streamlined 10() process should begin with the filing of the
charge. The printed charge form itself should make preliminary inquiry as to the need for rapid and temporary relief. And with a
166. E.g., Union of Professional Airmen v. Alaska Aero Indus., 95 L.R.R.M. 2868
(D. Alaska 1977), appeal dismissed, 625 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1980).
167. 651 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1981).
168. Id. at 907 n.4. It is true that some courts have strictly required the Board to
show "with reasonable probability from circumstances of the case that the remedial purpose of the Act would be frustrated unless immediate action is taken." Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1968). However, such a showing can
easily be made in most discharge cases in view of the well documented history of what
typically happens to discharged employees when they are reinstated many months, or
even years, after the unlawful termination. Timing is a crucial variable in reinstatement
cases.
169. See 1 NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL §§ 10310-12 (1983).

quick screening process at the regional level, the General Counsel's
recommendation to the Board could move rapidly. The case should
also receive expedited treatment on the Board side. A rotating threeMember panel could be maintained on a stand-by basis at all times
and thus be available to authorize filing the action without delay;
and one Member, also designated on a rotating basis, could be primarily responsible for the 10() docket. The process could become
routine and simple if the General Counsel's recommendations are
prompt and adequate. These procedures would not be difficult and
could be activated with amazing speed if the Board and General
Counsel should decide to use this remedy to compensate for the sluggishness of the Board's ordinarily slow hearing and remedial
processes.
Reorganizaton of Administrative Law Judge Operations
The Board is a court in its adjudication of unfair labor practices.
It is as much a court as the United States Tax Court.17 0 Both are
article I legislative courts, but the Tax Court is perceived as a court,
whereas the Board is not. The long tenure of tax judges - fifteen
years - certainly makes a difference; given the desire, however, the
Board could act more like a court in many of its functions. It was
not enough to change the title of "Trial Examiners" to "Administrative Law Judges." They also should function more like judges, at
least to the extent allowed by the statute. Their judicial function
could be improved if they were permitted to act more like court
judges. Within the limits allowed by the statute, the following recommendations are designed to assist in their achieving that status.
(1) The Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) should be geographically decentralized. This decentralization should be part of an integrated scheme of enforcement. Although individual ALJs should be
subject to both temporary and permanent geographical transfer to
meet the needs of the agency's docket, for the most part they should
be conveniently located in major metropolitan cities where the parties, that is, their attorneys, will have access to them, to their chambers, and to their courtrooms.
(2) As soon as a complaint issues, the case should be assigned to a
designated AL. That assignment might be changed later if necessary, but to the extent possible the same ALJ should handle every
motion and ruling that has to be made on the assigned case until
that case reaches the Board.
(3) Pre-trial conferences, discovery motions, summary judgment
motions (including partial summary judgments) should be entertained and encouraged. The parties should know they are in a
170.

I.R.C. § 7441 (1982).
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"court" in which a real, live judge is available to hear their claims.
(4) The ALJ should also be an additional conduit for section 10(j)
injunctive relief. Should it become apparent to the assigned ALJ, by
appropriate motion, that facts exist which require temporary judicial
restraint, the judge should make such recommendation to the Board,
either in an interim order or as part of the ALJ decision. The Board
should give such a recommendation considerable deference, for it
comes from the very person who, at that stage of the proceeding, is
in the best position to make an objective assessment of the need for
extraordinary remedial action.
OrderingDamage-Specific Final Remedies
Ironically, the familiar "affirmative action" concept originated
with the NLRA, which was subsequently the source of similar language in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.171 But in the
hands of federal district judges, the affirmative action concept was
used imaginatively and effectively to make title VII the law of the
land for which there developed substantial voluntary compliance something which has never been true of the NLRA. It is indeed late,
but it will never get any earlier, so the Board should now go forward
and order more effective "make whole" remedies. As long as such
remedies reasonably restore the status quo ante and are accompanied
by sufficient rationale, they should be able to pass judicial muster
and not be reversed for being either punitive or in violation of section
8(d).1 2 Here are some suggested examples of damage-specific
remedies:
(1) Section 8(a)(5) orders that relate to every item of unilateral
activity affecting mandatory subjects of bargaining.This remedy, to
171. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706 (g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); see also
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975); Morris, The Role of the Courts in the Collective
BargainingProcess:A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom and Unconventional Remedies, 30 VAND. L. REv. 661, 676-77 (1977).
172. As Judge Leventhal observed in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967), "the breadth of agency discretion is
. at zenith ... [in] the fashioning of policies, remedies and sanctions, including enforcement and voluntary compliance programs in order to arrive at maximum effectuation of Congressional objectives." See also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203, 215-17 (1964); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). But see H.K. Porter Co., 153
N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965), enforced sub nom. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966), reconsidered, 389 F.2d 295 (1967), supplemented, 172 N.L.R.B. 966 (1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397
U.S. 99 (1970) (Board violated section 8(d)).

be fully effective, should be coupled with a rule which clearly puts
bargaining parties on notice that once a labor organization has been
established as bargaining agent, every action of the employer relating to mandatory subjects, including discipline, discharges, layoffs,
promotions, and of course merit wage increases, must be negotiated
to impasse with the bargaining agent. Although a union could conditionally waive its negotiation rights as to individual and ad hoc situations pending agreement on an entire collective bargaining contract,
it also could withdraw that waiver whenever it felt that bargaining
on the contract was not progressing satisfactorily. In the event of a
section 8(a)(5) violation, the Board, similar to its approach in Trading Port,173 should seek to remedy each situation in which the em-

ployer has acted unilaterally, even if that requires nullifying some
promotions, demotions, wage changes, or other actions involving conditions of employment, including layoffs and discharges, at least
when the
Board can determine that they were not made for
"cause."'' The Board's process should not be looked upon as a game
with certifications and cease-and-desist orders being viewed merely
as separate rounds in the sport of "industrial-relations combat." The
duty to bargain should be made to be what it was intended to be a duty.
(2) Interest on back pay awards should be based on what it would
have cost the dischargee to borrow the money lost as a result of the
unlawful termination. Consumer-loan rates have been rarely lower
than sixteen percent and often as high as twenty-one percent. For
some employers, it might no longer be cost effective to discharge employees to discourage pro-union sentiment.
(3) "Frivolous defense" reimbursement for attorneys fees, organizational expenses, and dues

75

should be ordered more often. This

remedy should be based upon an examination of all of the respondent's defenses, and if one or only a few of a larger number of
mostly frivolous defenses is debatable, the stronger reimbursement
17
remedy should apply. 6

(4) Other examples. What is required is a matching of the offense
with the harm which it has caused: the remedy selected should be a
solution consistent with the objectives of the NLRA. One example of
a missed opportuntity was the Board majority's failure to adopt
Member Walther's remedy in Atlas Tack Corp.,177 where the em173. Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
174. Cf. NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982); NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d
748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954), supplemented, 115 N.L.R.B. 1591.
175. See Teamsters Local 705 (Gasoline Retailers Ass'n of Metropolitan Chicago), 210 N.L.R.B. 210 (1974).
176. See Morris, supra note 171, at 667-80.
177. 226 N.L.R.B. 222 (1976); see also Morris, supra note 171, at 683-84.
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ployer had reduced compensated time by unilaterally changing break
and lunch periods and the length of the work day. Member Walther
dissented from imposition of the traditional remedy of distributing
the sum among past and present employees, proposing instead to
treat the total amount of back pay as a fund over which the parties
could negotiate at the bargaining table. He reasoned that "the highest possible priority must be given to restoring the union to its preunlawful conduct strength. .

.

. [E]very effort must be made to cre-

ate an environment in which it is economically advantageous for the
employer to engage in meaningful collective bargaining." 1178 That
type of analysis could be used effectively in many situations, so that
"make whole" would become an attainable goal.
Section 10(e) and 10(f Injunctions
The provisions in section 10 relating to enforcement and review of
the Board's final orders in a United States Court of Appeals contain
authority for the court to issue "such injunctive relief or temporary
restraining order as it deems just and proper.""u 9 Many courts of
appeals are reluctant to grant such relief, primarily due to the
Board's own delayed process.180 Nevertheless, a strong and persistent
effort should be made to use this injunctive power with some frequency; this may require the Board not only to speed up its own
decisional process in general, but also to establish'a specific hearing
record in the subject cases showing the need for such relief. Partial
remand to the ALJ who originally heard the case to make specific
fact-findings regarding the need for special remedies may be appropriate. Also, separate hearings on the issue of appropriate remedy,
conducted by the ALJ prior to the time the case goes to the Board,
may sometimes be justified. The latter device would be another advantage of having the same ALJ in charge of the case from the day
the complaint issues to the day the case is transferred to the Board
on exceptions.
178.

Atlas Tack, 226 N.L.R.B. at 223.

179. NLRA § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1982).
180. See, e.g., NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 389 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1967). See Attachment C to NLRB Task Force Committee III from John S. Irving, General Counsel,
regarding section 10(e) relief, in 1976 LAB. REL Y.B. 378-81, in which the General
Counsel stated: "Overcoming the reluctance of the courts to grant 10(e) relief would be a
highly significant step in achieving the remedial purposes of the Act." Id. at 381. That
memorandum also noted, "if there is to be court acceptance of the 10(e) remedy, the
problem of administrative delay must be alleviated." Id. Unfortunately, the problem still
exists.

WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

The foregoing recommendations, which have focused upon procedures and remedies already in the statute, were based upon the premise that Congress intended the NLRA to be enforceable as to all
its provisions and that the Act contains adequate means to achieve
such enforcement. But how can the Board and the General Counsel
be convinced to utilize those means? And how can a President in the
appointment process be convinced to consistently appoint only highly
qualified persons of judicial temperament, preferably nonpolitical appointees, so that there will be a mutual understanding and expectation that their mandate includes an intent to exercise the full statutory powers of the position? Let me hasten to add that over the years
almost all of the appointees to the Board and to the office of General
Counsel have been well qualified, but there was never any special
expectation or implied mandate that they would enforce the Act
with full vigor and imagination.
I am pessimistic about the Board's future. Indeed, the NLRB may
never leave the dog house. But the Board is too important to the
American political and economic system to be jettisoned without
every reasonable effort being made to save it and use it. Given presidential desire and political courage, as well as either strong popular
support or substantial consensus among leading figures in the industrial relations community, or if the majority of the Board and the
General Counsel, acting with the independence which is supposed to
characterize an independent federal agency, were similarly motivated to chart a new direction, then perhaps - just perhaps - the
old Board might be able to learn to use some new tricks. It might
become sufficiently depoliticized to achieve most of its true potential,
or at least to make a beginning move in that direction. If this does
not occur, then we should explore other alternatives.
Regardless of the direction taken, the National Labor Relations
Act itself can be of inestimable value to the American industrial relations system and the economy it was intended to serve. Long-range
economic objectives, particularly those relating to more equitable income distribution domestically and more successful industrial competition internationally, can benefit from a smoothly functioning industrial relations system, especially a system such as the one created
by the NLRA, which is based upon principles of democracy and
freedom of choice. The normative patterns which the NLRA was
intended to foster can and should serve a vital role in moving this
nation's economy toward attaining those long-range objectives.

